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ABSTRACT 
The paper has a dual purpose. First, we suggest that entrepreneurs in their establishment of 
new businesses draw on a range of pre-existing socially embedded routines for creating 
acceptance by their environment. Also they draw upon external resources that are used in 
patterning specific practices. This ability is treated as entrepreneurial assets. Secondly, we 
argue that the existence and patterning of these socially embedded routines used in new 
business development are contingent on the institutional context. We see the institutional 
context as complex and fragmented, composed and shaped by different institutional domains: 
the normative, the cognitive and the regulatory domain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a continuing focus on the conditions for and processes of establishing new businesses 
and the role played by the external resource context in doing so. Several recent studies points 
to the important supporting as well as restraining role of networks in this process, using 
sociological concepts such as network bricolage (Garud & Karnøe, 2002; Baker, Miner & 
Eesly, 2002) and structuration (Jack & Andersen, 2002). However, most research focuses on 
the innovative role of entrepreneurs in linking together dispersed resources in forming a 
concerted business enterprise. Far less focus has been on the de facto quality of these 
resources in forming the entrepreneurial role. Rather, the image of the Knightian or Kriznian 
entreprenur is left unchallenged, even in the “new” literature on entrepreneurship. However, if 
the concept of network bricolage or structuration as contexts institutionalising specific 
practices and sorting away others is taken seriously, the pre-existence of patterned work 
practices shared among business actors, and how the ability to utilise these patterned practices 
in generating new business ideas affects the business start up process becomes important. 
Entrepreneurial processes may not only be influenced but also internally constituted by the 
wider environment. One may therefore question whether the impetus for business start-up 
vests entirely with the entrepreneur or what role the context plays in patterning the work of 
the entrepreneur in firm creation. As pointed out by Gartner (1988) asking “who is the 
entrepreneur?” is the wrong question. For that purpose, we believe that the viewing the 
context of the entrepreneur as (partly) consisting of networks and embedded routines that 
provides an ample opportunity for understanding how the context contributes in shaping the 
entrepreneurial act (Andersen, 2003). 
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We study this phenomenon through case studies of business start-ups in the biotech 
sector in two, which represent very different institutional contexts: Denmark and USA. The 
biotech sector provides a strong empirical background for investigating entrepreneurship 
activities since frequent business-start ups (and closures) is a distinctive characteristic of the 
biotech industry (Mangematin et al, 2002; Norus, 2002). Each of the cases concerns 
university scientists, who decide leave the university in order to establish their own company.  
Our study revolves around four critical activities of their business start-up: enactment of 
market possibilities, attraction of venture capital, relations to the university, and coping with 
the regulatory environment. 
Our paper is structured as follows; we provide a background review of the importance 
of networks for new business development and argue how the routine concept may provide a 
background for addressing some of these issues. In particular, we link the conditions for 
starting up new business to the process of creating legitimacy in the institutional context. We 
then present the empirical context where we seek to investigate these issues; we use our cases 
representing business start-ups in the biotech industry in illustrating these differences, and 
link the nature and type of the embedded routines with the broader institutional context within 
which they rest. In our discussion and concluding part, we draw implications for practitioners 
and academia. 
 
THE INTERPLAY OF ENTREPRENEURS AND NETWORK EMBEDDED ROUTINES 
We define firm creation as the initiative and processes leading to the establishment 
and formalisation of a new business enterprise as a legal entity. Establishing a new firm holds 
essentially both an element of entrepreneurial initiative and a process of creating acceptance 
from multiple stakeholders vested in the environment of the entrepreneur, upon which firm 
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creation is depending. From the perspective of institutional sociology this process may be 
seen as one of creating organisational legitimacy within regulatory, cognitive and normative 
institutional settings (Scott & Meyer, 1991; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). The institutional 
approach is concerned with the content of the environment in terms of purposes, properties, 
resources and sovereignty and its role in structuring social actors as well as channelling social 
actors. For instance, North see institutions as constraints for human actions, providing the 
order necessary to reduce exchange uncertainty (North, 1990). Such rules a seen as embodied 
in consensual values, rules and techniques which are highly culture-dependent as they are 
constituted by human action as well as constituting it through processes of socialisation. We 
agree with Jack & Anderson (2002), who suggest that social embeddedness is a variable and 
is contingent on causes and consequences, which are highly space-specific. Secondly, we 
believe that services rendered by embedded routines in firm creations primarily serve the 
purpose of creating legitimacy from the institutional contexts for the business enterprise. 
Legitimacy can be seen as a commodity through which the organisation gains acceptance and 
hereby access to resources from the wider environment. In particular for firm creation 
purposes this commodity is critical, since entrepreneurship usually crucially depends on 
external resource access. 
Our research focus can be outlined as depicted in our conceptual model below in 
figure 1, drawing on Kazanjian’s (1988) model for business development as well as the model 
suggested by Jack & Anderson (2002). 
Figure 1 in here 
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 Institutional Contexts for Firm Creation 
There are to our knowledge only a few theoretical accounts on the role of institutions 
and the provision of legitimacy in firm creation. Bloodgood et al. has pointed to key social 
factors affecting entrepreneurial behaviour and among those the issue of creating legitimacy. 
Moreover, Webster (1976) speaks of “the knothole” as the critical moment of any business 
start up in relation to gaining acceptance from external stakeholders. Institutional contexts are 
often complex and fragmented and consisting of multiple task environments, stakeholders, 
resource providers and “pillars” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Research on legitimacy has 
suggested that the institutions operating in the task environment of the firm impact on the 
forms of legitimacy operating.  We believe that these differences can be described using the 
pillars of institutional environments suggested by Scott (1995): Regulatory, cognitive and 
normative pillars. The regulatory pillar is composed of the formal rules, laws and enforcement 
mechanisms of a society and those issuing these (North, 1990). In order to gain legitimacy, 
firm creators must act according to positive law; they must comply with the explicitly stated 
requirements of the environment within which they find themselves. The cognitive pillar 
draws from cognitive research on institutions and how they enact specific orders or shared 
codes in particular settings such as for instance regions (Dei Ottati, 1994) industries (Spender, 
1989) or even societies (Whitley, 1992). From an institutional viewpoint, cognitive rules 
concerns shared mental maps of what is expected from others, which aids in identifying and 
classifying actors. Finally, the normative pillar goes beyond regulatory rules and cognitive 
heuristics and addresses social values, focusing on degree of positive cultural support firm 
creators might gain from acting in accordance with the dominant values of their surrounding 
business contexts (Meyer & Scott, 1983). Thus, the normative institutions provide 
 6
prioritization and selection mechanisms for selecting from the roster of classifications, 
explicit rules and enforcement mechanisms available. 
 
FIRM CREATION: THE INTERPLAY OF THE ENTREPRENEUR AND THE CONTEXT 
The process of firm creation is often likened with that of entrepreneurship, although 
entrepreneurship frequently has a broader scope than firm creation (Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000). In research views on entrepreneurship tends to focus solely on the personal traits of 
entrepreneurs and the consequences of what they do. For instance, economists’ focus is on the 
distribution of entrepreneurial talent or on the macro-level mechanisms of converting 
technical information into business opportunities (Baumol, 1996; Carlsson & Eliasson, 2001). 
The role of the entrepreneur according to this approach is to arbitrage between certain inputs 
and uncertain outputs in the pursuit of entrepreneurial profits (Van Praag, 1999). Hence, the 
contribution of the entrepreneur is seen as the ability to translate uncertainty to risk (Knight, 
1925).  
More recently, a growing part of the literature on entrepreneurship have taken a 
sociological stance and points to the important role of network contexts of entrepreneurs, 
suggesting entrepreneurship rather than being a solitary act of heroic individuals builds on the 
efforts of many (Garud & Karnøe, 2002). Thus, focus is moved from the solitary entrepreneur 
into also taking the context of the entrepreneur into consideration, acknowledging that most 
entrepreneurs build on their existing relations when establishing new companies. This has 
been backed up by substantial empirical research (Uzzi, 1997; Baker, Miner & Eesley, 2002).  
The process defining the rationale for firm creation have been described as 
improvisational competencies; the ability to design and execute novel actions (Baker, Miner 
& Eerley, 2002). The network context of entrepreneurs however not only support business 
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start-ups but is also seen as a restraining force. Network actors are interweaved into certain 
paths or trajectories, institutionalising specific regulations, cognitions, norms and patterns of 
behaviour at the expense of others. For instance, Garud & Karnøe points out that, “In being 
entrepreneurial, actors cannot do anything they please. As embedded actors, they entertain 
certain abilities and not others” (cf. Garud & Karnøe 2002, p. 5). 
However, at the core of these novel approaches drawing in the context for 
understanding firm creation, the role of the entrepreneur as an arbitrager between certain 
inputs and uncertain outputs remains the same. According to this viewpoint, entrepreneurs are 
socialised actors, using their beneficial network position (i.e. the abundant number of social 
ties) to legitimise their access to resources such as information or capital. Founding a new 
company is still seen as proactive and based on improvisational competences, occurring when 
design and execution of novel actions converge (Baker, Miner & Eesley, 2002). The initiative 
for starting up a new business remains the responsibility of the entrepreneur. However, a 
question remains regarding the role of the resources provided by the context in respect to 
entrepreneurial act. To what extent do entrepreneurs rely on superior foresight and/or 
improvisational abilities and to what extent are they able to rely on the programmatic nature 
of their environment in providing and concerting the necessary complementary skills and 
assets for their entrepreneurial endeavour? If the concept of network bricolage or structuration 
as contexts institutionalising specific practices and sorting away others must be taken 
seriously, the pre-existence of patterned work practices shared among business actors, and 
how the ability to utilise these patterned practices in generating new business ideas affects the 
business start up process becomes important. According to structuration theory participants 
must draw on pre-existing rules in order to enact a social practice. For instance, entrepreneurs 
may be a habitual practice in the sense that entrepreneurs establish multiple business 
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ownership as a mechanisms for profit max/or uncertainty avoidance trough multiple betting 
(Westhead & Wright, 1998; Scott & Rosa, 1996). Therefore, even though entrepreneurship is 
the production of something new, it is at the same time in concurrence with the past, 
supplying the means of its institution. Given the structured nature of the surroundings of 
entrepreneurs, one might expect that their entrepreneurial role would depend more on skilled 
abilities to concert pre-existing patterned actions and entrepreneurial routines than that what is 
implicitly assumed – even in the sociologically inspired contributions to research on 
entrepreneurship.  
In order to address this issue we need to investigate more in depth the nature of the 
resources provided by the network context and how they link to the acts carried out by the 
entrepreneur. In the current literature the concept of network bricolage prevails. This concept, 
borrowed from sociological structuralist Lewi-Strauss, suggests that entrepreneurs may use 
the means at hand within the network (Baker, Miner & Eesley, 2002). The idea of bricolage 
seems however not particularly useful for understanding the nature of these means, how they 
present themselves to the business entrepreneur in relation to business start-ups and what the 
nature is of the services they might render. For that purpose we find the notion of embedded 
routines much more helpful and specific. Compared to the concept of means and/or resources 
and skills, routines are an action oriented concept, meaning that it addresses not only what 
there is but what it does, i.e. what performances are carried out by actors (Norus 2002, 
Andersen 2003). 
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NETWORK-EMBEDDED ROUTINES - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LEGITIMACY IN 
THE FIRM CREATION PROCESS 
 A routine may be defined as a patterned sequence of learned behaviour involving 
multiple actors who are linked by relations of communication and/or authority (Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994). Individual routines combine to become collective responses, which may be 
further configured, selected or otherwise linked to various other forms of routines. In this 
form, routines describe the capabilities of organised economic activity (Nelson, 1991).  
For individual actors, the system of routines in which they can engage signals a pattern of 
predictability in which actors have invested through their development of skills (Norus, 
1999). Each employee handles uncertainty in interpreting the acts of others. The uncertainty 
involved relates to the cognitive abilities and limitations of human beings. It follows that 
patterned sequences of learned behaviour, i.e., routines, are formed through social practice 
and that they are most likely to emerge in connection with the making of some specific output 
such as a product. Hence, the involvement of new actors in existing routines is highly 
dependent on coordinated reciprocity (Weick, 1979). 
In social interaction, rules and norms emerge which have properties similar to those of 
routines in terms of producing concerted individual action in order to attain organisational 
performance. Rules are common-sense constructs or webs of signification shared by a range 
of individuals who belong to a specific socio-cognitive society such as a profession 
(Kallinikos, 1989; Koppl & Langlois, 1994). This notion links to embeddedness, which sees 
patterns of inter-personal coordination as being interlinked in broader social structures and 
partly governed by the entrenched and ongoing contextualisation of exchange systems which 
may be noticed in the emergence of norm systems and of regularities in conduct (Granovetter, 
1985).  
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In the following, we will address the role of routines in relation to the creation of 
legitimacy in the firm creation process. We will focus on processes of firm creation initiatives 
taken on by scientists in the biotech sector, where a subset of particularly critical issues in 
relation to establishing legitimacy in firm creation processes can be raised. Rather than taking 
an explorative account of which factors may be seen as critical in different institutional 
contexts, we have selected these factors in order to conduct a comparison across institutional 
contexts concerning the role of the entrepreneur and that of proposed embedded routines. 
Very few comparative studies have been made on entrepreneurship (Suzuki, Kim & Bae, 
2002). We expect critical issues to take on different meaning in specific institutional contexts, 
and correspondingly we assume that the nature of the externally evoked routines will differ in 
correspondence with institutional variation. We have chosen to focus upon market enactment, 
attraction of venture capital, relation to public authorities and the relation to off-spring 
university. 
 
Market Enactment 
Market enactment concerns the creation of the business idea upon which the proposed firm 
rests. As pointed out by Hayek, knowledge is distributed in its form, which makes it possible 
for entrepreneurs to discover exchange possibilities as resource holders valuate their resources 
differently, because of differences in knowledge on use. According to Kirzner (1979), 
entrepreneurial discovery relates to the interpretive faculty or alertness of the entrepreneur. 
The entrepreneurial discovery may be more or less deliberate and obvious (Demmert & Kelin, 
2003), suggesting that the entrepreneurs’ ability to conduct entrepreneurial discoveries rests 
on their access to knowledge. However, as suggested by several, entrepreneurial activities 
often unfold in teams and wider networks, calling in for various incubators and interface 
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services in maturing their idea (Johannisson, 1988; Clarysse & Moray, 2002). In particular, 
relating to the process of research-based spin offs, entrepreneurial teams are often seen as 
levers of business formation (Clarysse & Moray, 2002). We expect that the affiliation with 
these external providers of knowledge may render some entrepreneurial discoveries as more 
prone than others. In particular, we assume that market enactment may be partly fuelled by 
the availability of embedded routines in the network of the entrepreneur and that the 
efficiency of these routines differs with respect to their ability meet different legitimacy issues 
facing the firm creation process. 
 
Attraction of Venture Capital 
Attraction of venture capital is another important issue, particularly in the biotech business 
creation processes (Mangematin et al, 2002). Venture capital firms have played an interesting 
and central role in the biotechnology community. A venture capital firm is in principle a 
financial institution or a money tank whose mission is to place money in high-risk investment 
projects or ventures. The term high-risk investment should be taken literally, the basic rule 
being that only one of eight projects is profitable. Venture capital firms carefully develop 
their projects in calculated portfolio investments to minimize losses. One way of minimizing 
losses is to hold a majority of shares in the venture. Normally a venture capital firm holds 
around 70% of the shares in small biotechnology firms in exchange for providing the capital. 
Aside from appointing the CEO, the venture capital firm has the power to make decisions 
about selling the firm, licensing agreements, strategic alliances and outsourcing activities. 
There are two major reasons for the governance of the venture capital community concerning 
engagements in the biotechnology industry. First, venture capital firms experienced vast 
losses in the early phase of the biotechnology industry. Second, the structure of the venture 
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capital community has changed. Institutional investors such as pension funds have weakened 
the role of the philanthropic venture capital ideal (family and private foundations). Also the 
structure of the investment has changed. Prior the biotechnology firm if successful the firm 
went from venture capital funding to an IPO (initial public offering) now strategies of the 
venture capital firms have changed into a venture capital process with several rounds of VC-
funding before an IPO. Normally the entrepreneur has no prior relations to the venture capital 
community and this is one of the major problems that the small biotechnology entrepreneurs 
are facing. Also the entrepreneurs often do not have a deep insight in the venture capital 
process and that creates problems right form the beginning. First problem is how to approach 
the VC’s. Second problem is how much money to ask for. Third problem is problem of 
leaving authority and control of the firm. Fourth problem is sharing the potential profits with 
the venture capitalists (Norus, 2002). 
 
Relation to Public Authorities 
Public authorities constitute a vital part of the regulatory institutional context facing processes 
of firm creation. For business entrepreneurs, public authorities and administrative bodies do 
not represent a unified group of actors with a common goal. Rather they have diverse 
purposes and represent conflicting interests, for instance both in terms of promoting 
innovation (i.e. through tax incentives and formation of institutions supporting business start-
ups) as well as demanding certain policies of the firm (tax laws, laws regarding personnel 
management, etc) restricting the forms these innovations may take. Not least, in relation to 
business start-ups in the biotech sector, public authorities and approval boards have a decisive 
influence on business activities. Laws and regulations in relation to approval procedures, 
regulations of research activities (for instance in relation to cloning and testing of drugs) are 
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important legitimacy issues facing entrepreneurs in the biotech sector (Norus, 2002). In 
particular, for entrepreneurs, which primary competence is in conducting research, the lack of 
familiarity towards the policies and rules of public authorities can be perceived as an 
insurmountable barrier (Norus, 1999). Network embedded routines for developing legitimacy 
toward public authorities are likely to be found, as experienced entrepreneurs, consultants and 
specialists may “know the ropes” and hold the necessary knowledge for business development 
(Mønsted, 1985). For instance, so-called “business angels”, which may provide entrepreneurs 
with the necessary experiences or contacts are commonly found (Westhead & Wright, 1998). 
Regulatory policies co-vary with institutional contexts at both the national and the regional 
level. Moreover, the demand for externally embedded resources of these matters may also 
strongly depend on the complexity of these environments. We therefore assume, that the 
nature and function of externally embedded routines will reflect differences in institutional 
contexts. 
 
University Relations 
A common and probably universal characteristic of most biotech start-up firms is that their 
founders usually have a scientific background and for that reason are members of researcher 
networks as well as have extensive knowledge and formal affiliations to the university world. 
For that reason, the biotech entrepreneur is faced with a set of specific legitimacy issues, 
although we expect their magnitude and characteristics to unfold contingent on the 
institutional context. In a study of science-based spin-offs from a research university, 
Steffensen, Rogers and Speakman (1999) identified negotiations of property rights, 
sharing/use of university facilities, maintaining resource exchange facilities with the 
university and ensuring the possibility for a return to a tenured position at the university, 
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should the venture project fail. We expect that the process of handling university relations 
during processes of firm creation differ markedly across institutional contexts for several 
reasons: first, universities are differently positioned in their regulatory context, and for that 
reason host different policies with respect to negotiating property rights with spin-offs and to 
what extent and under which conditions entrepreneurs are allowed to use and share university 
facilities during firm creation processes. Moreover, normative institutional contexts, with 
respect to the university scientists’ social position in society and their legitimacy as 
entrepreneurs are likely to differ (Suzuki, Kim & Bae, 2002). This in turn may impact on their 
ability to escape the hazards of entrepreneurship and retreat into tenure. Correspondingly, and 
reflecting these institutional differences on university relations we expect to find markedly 
different embedded routines constituted in the network of the entrepreneur. Whereas 
universities in particular contexts provide several complementary routines for handling 
science-based spin-off issues, we expect them to differ, reflecting the normative context and 
regulatory context. Hence, university bodies and informal science networks may vary with 
respect to their support and their ability to facilitate firm creation processes. 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY - AN ‘ENABLING TECHNOLOGY’ 
In its present sense biotechnology is a complex technology that consists of multiple 
technologies, techniques, research areas and professional identities. Many of these 
technologies and techniques are based on old technologies that have been extended due to the 
development of the new technologies. Research and development in the area of biotechnology 
depend on advances in other technological fields. First of all it depends on information 
technology, e.g. the development of simulations of molecules and secondly it depends on 
developments in the area of new materials for example to build fermentors and medical 
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devices with improved performances. The development of biotechnologies therefore requires 
skills and competencies in multiple techniques and processes in order to manage the process 
of taking a product from the scientific and experimental stage to production. Therefore, 
biotechnology can more appropriately be described as an “enabling technology” in that it 
combines new materials and information technology in ways that facilitate new products that 
could not be produced by applying any of the elements isolated. (Oakey et al., 1990). One 
example would be the development of biotechnological process plants that requires 
combining skills in biotechnological processes with advanced computer measurements and 
the construction of stainless steel tanks (Norus, 1998).  
The implications of labelling biotechnology as an enabling technology are that 
biotechnology are defined as a series of related cross disciplinary concepts rather than trying 
to break each of the underlying techniques into a single technology e.g. genetic engineering. 
Instead of building up concepts grouped round types of products or industrial segments for 
instance foodstuffs or pharmaceutical products the idea is to acknowledge the variety of 
industrial applications that the advantages in modern biology has opened for. Despite our 
strong attention to the pharmaceutical industry it is important to stress that the new 
biotechnologies are applied in the development also in the chemical industry, the agro 
industry (both animal production and plant production), the food industry, the energy industry 
and the environmental industry.  
The new biotechnologies are almost tailor-made for the pharmaceutical industry. The new 
biotechniques are to be regarded as additional tools that lead to competition with the 
established skills and competencies represented by the existing process techniques. 
Traditionally, the pharmaceutical industry has relied on chemical synthesis and thereby the 
skills of pharmacists and chemists. Irrespective of this conservatism, the pharmaceutical 
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industry has been the industrial sector that has attracted the greatest interest in relation to 
development and investment in new biotechnology products and processes. About 70% of all 
investments in biotechnology, both private and public, tend to be allocated to the 
pharmaceutical area. In the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology is applied to develop four 
types product areas: 1) Diagnostic products, products that can detect diseases and infections, 
such as AIDS, Hepatitis, and blood lead poison, pregnancy, etc. This can be in form of test its 
or diagnostic devices. 2) Therapeutics, which is productS used in medical treatment to 
alleviate and cure diseases and products that seek to cure and prevent diseases, such as 
vaccines. 3) Medical devices. 4) Platform technologies, products that aims at improving or 
replacing existing process technologies in the production of pharmaceuticals 
 
AN INDUSTRY OPERATING IN FOUR DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 
The costs of getting products approved are increasing resulting in the skyrocketing of costs 
for developing new products due to the time it takes to prepare the necessary documentation 
ready for the public authorities, such as the FDA – The Federal Food and Drug 
Administration. The FDA is a crucial in the pharmaceutical production since this institution 
has the authority to approve products for food consumption and medicines. Also outside FDA 
approval plays an important role since the US market for pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical 
relations products by far is largest single market. Due to reliability and the strictness of the 
FDA approval procedures, a company with such an approval almost automatically will have 
their product approved by the public authorities elsewhere in the world. 
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“FDA's regulatory approaches to marketing approval of the products it regulates are as 
varied as the products themselves. These differences are dictated by the laws FDA enforces 
and the relative risks that the products pose to consumers. 
Some products -- such as new drugs and complex medical devices -- must be proven safe and 
effective before companies can put them on the market. The agency also must approve new 
food additives before they can be used in foods. Other products -- such as x-ray machines and 
microwave ovens -- must measure up to performance standards. And some products -- such as 
cosmetics and dietary supplements -- can generally be marketed with no prior approval.  
At the heart of all FDA's medical product evaluation decisions is a judgment about whether a 
new product's benefits to users will outweigh its risks. No regulated product is totally risk-
free, so these judgments are important. FDA will allow a product to present more of a risk 
when its potential benefit is great -- especially for products used to treat serious, life-
threatening conditions.  
FDA reviews the results of laboratory, animal and human clinical testing done by companies 
to determine if the product they want to put on the market is safe and effective. FDA does not 
develop or test products itself. The Agency does this pre-market review for new human drugs 
and biologics (such as vaccines, blood products, biotechnology products and gene therapy), 
complex medical devices, food and color additives, infant formulas, and animal drugs”.  
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/7approvl.html 
 
The relative vague formulation on the types of regulation that new biotechnology product 
undergo depend on whether the clinical test include human testing. Therefore the nature of the 
relations to the FDA that the biotechnology firms have to build up seems almost 
incomparable. In our opinion we both de facto and theoretically are facing an industry that is 
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in four different institutional domains. This means that the large pharmaceutical industry have 
incorporate a very broad set of routines covering all these domains in order to handle the 
innovation challenge from the new biotechnologies. 
Transferring the regulatory aspects into Scott & Meyer’s (1991) discussion on 
combining technical and institutional environments, it is clear that the application of 
biotechnology in the pharmaceutical means that we analyze an industrial segment that 
operates in four different institutional domains. 
 According to Scott & Meyer we have to do with incomparable industries, but what we 
face is that the existence and the role of the small biotechnology firms allow large 
pharmaceutical firms to orchestrate their innovative activities in order to balance between 
product innovation and process innovation through collaborative arrangements with small 
biotechnology firms. In figure 2 we have turned Scott & Meyers’ matrix into an analytical 
tool where we can place different types of biotechnology activities that takes place in the 
pharmaceutical industry into their specific regulatory domains. We have substituted the 
concept of ‘technical environments’ at the vertical axis with whether the firms have to test 
their product on human beings. At the horizontal axis we that replaced ‘institutional 
environments’ with the degree to which the products in questions have to comply with low or 
tight regulation. Consequently we have put in the four companies that we use as cases in the 
following section. 
Figure 2 in here 
 
PRESENTING THE EXPLORATIVE CASE STUDY 
In order to tentatively subject our ideas to some empirical data, we take departure in a set of 
case studies conducted on biotech start-up firms. The empirical findings stem from 
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longitudinal case studies that have taken place since 1991 in the Danish biotechnology firm, 
Kem-En-Tec. ThermoGen and AndCare has been investigated from 1993 until 2001. Whereas 
managers from Cobento has been interviewed during 2002. The data has been gathered 
through series of interviews sessions with the entrepreneurs, members of the management 
team and key personnel into both the research labs and the business development. The great 
advantage of longitudinal case study method has been our ability to follow the four firm’s 
development and establishing relationships to the four major actor groups in our paper, the 
access to new knowledge through university relations, their relations and access to the venture 
capital community, the firm’s interpretation and creation of the market relations and the 
development of relations to the public and regulatory bodies.  
 
Kem-En-Tec – Medical Devices 
Kem-En-Tec was established as a merger between two small biotechnology firms, JKA 
Biotech and Kem-En-Tec Partners, both of which were founded in the beginning of the 1980s. 
Both firms had roots in Danish research institutions: JKA Biotech originated from Denmark’s 
Technical University whereas Kem-En-Tec Partners was established from a laboratory at 
University of Copenhagen. Kem-En-Tec Partners was founded by two associate professors at 
the Protein Laboratory together with one of their graduate students. The three founders had 
developed a technique that made it possible to produce proteins of a better quality and at a 
cheaper price. Focus for their business was to develop and produce plant proteins that were 
used for research and development purposes in both industrial and university laboratories. 
JKA Biotech had specialized in the development of technical devices and equipment that 
could be used to characterize and purify of proteins. Apart from the people from Kem-En-Tec 
Partners, the researchers from Denmark’s Technical University already had developed the 
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equipment but they lacked a clear vision or an idea of how to sell and market the device. The 
solution to the problem of both companies appeared in 1987 when the two firms decided to 
enter into a partnership by establishing a joint sales company Kem-En-Tec. Series of changes 
underwent after the company successfully were able to attract two venture capital firms to 
invest in the firm.  
Market enactment. In the initial phase of Kem-En-Tec’s history, the long-term 
perspective was to launch products for the established biotechnological industry and the large 
research institutions. Kem-En-Tec started out selling to the research community and these 
contacts were established through the scientific community that the founder was familiar with 
and also a part of. The firm was too small to function as a supplier of products to especially 
large customers (companies and research institutions). It was difficult to be acknowledged as 
a dependable partner since this required that the firm could meet customers’ requirements. 
The firms had difficulties in establishing relationships of trust, i.e., could the customers trust 
the firm’s ability to deliver the required products just-in-time and are the capable of fulfilling 
the technical standards. Also, in the research community, it is difficult to create the necessary 
trustworthiness.  
 To overcome this, a consultancy service was initiated in order to demonstrate to future 
customers that the company had the skills and should be recognized as a legitimate partner 
within the biotechnological community. Doing consultancy made it possible to improve the 
financial situation and also broadened the technological scope by getting access to work with 
process technology at large scale. The consultancy services meant that Kem-En-Tec was 
acknowledged as having the necessary competencies to develop reliable devices.  
Relations to the university. A second form of market contact was established through 
scientific publication and active participation in related research conferences. This is an 
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indirect way of approaching and creating a market for new biotechnology products and 
processes that all biotechnology firms in my population of entrepreneurs had experienced. In 
the case of Kem-En-Tec, the firm built up its profile through scientific publication in journals 
in the area of process development. These articles were afterwards used as a sort of 
advertisement; Kem-En-Tec offered to make some tests that could improve a partnering 
firm’s products and also demonstrate Kem-En-Tec’s capability.  
 Indeed, Kem-En-Tec kept up with a variety of procedures and norms rooted in its 
academic past. First of all, the company maintained the individual's right to spend time on so-
called 'leisure projects' or bootleg projects, allowing the employees to work on projects that 
had no relation to the formal activities. The bootleg projects served a dual purpose: they were 
long-term investments given that they proved to have commercial interest.  
Access to venture capital. One of the very few Danish venture capital firms, Scantech, 
showed interests in the firm in 1989. After intense and almost existential discussions between 
the founding entrepreneurs of the two initial firms, they agreed on going for venture capital 
money to develop the firm. A few months later another Danish venture capital firm, Danish 
Development Finance (DDF), invested in the firm. DDF had special interest in one of Kem-
en-Tec’s development projects and its investment was solely targeted toward this single 
development project. The project orientation that was enforced by the venture capital firms 
meant that each project had its own sponsor and its own distinct business model. Eventually, 
this also forced Kem-En-Tec to separate the two most promising projects into two subsidiary 
firms.  
Relations to regulatory bodies and public institutions. Due to the nature of the 
organization of the company and the way that they had target their products Kem-En-Tec did 
not have to build up relationships directly with public regulatory authorities. Another reason 
 22
for this was that Kem-En-Tec also sold off or spun-off projects to industrial partners when the 
development projects showed clear commercial perspectives. In that sense a combination of 
the firm’s interpretation of the market, the nature of the technologies that they aimed at and 
the predominant research culture meant that they could stay out of developing these 
relationships. 
 
Cobento Biotech ApS 
Cobento Biotech is a Danish biotech producer of human vitamin B12 binding proteins. Lars 
Berglund (LB) formed together with five scientists from the University of Aarhus and the 
University Hospital in Aarhus, Denmark the company after discovering recombinant human 
proteins grown on plants that can be used to promote the uptake and utilisation of vitamin 
B12. The use of plant material for the production of these human vitamin B12 binding 
proteins is significantly better and less expensive than the current methods such as animal or 
yeast products. The company was formed in November 2001, and has recently attracted 
sufficient venture capital for full-scale production from a group of Danish venture capitalists. 
 
Market enactment. The business start-up of Cobento was based on previous collaboration 
between LB and colleagues from agricultural biotech research in plant genetics. In the early 
90’s LB started working in a new DNA laboratory at the University of Aarhus. The lab was 
the only one with experience in protein chemistry and got funding from the Danish Dairy 
Industry. The lab attracted several international experts who learned, LB and his colleagues 
how to isolate and characterize proteins as well as producing them using transgenetic 
organisms such as yeast, and plants. As the clinical aspects of milk proteins was part of their 
research focus they came in contact with Ebba Nexø (EN), a professor at the university 
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hospital with an in-depth knowledge of this area: By combining her knowledge about B12 
deficiency with his own expertise in isolating the genes and from mapping the genes, LB 
formulated his business idea. He invited EN to join his company together with several work 
colleagues from the DNA laboratory and Erik Ø. Jensen (EØJ) with whom he had previous 
work experience in growing transgenetic plants. EN contributed with her network from the 
clinic in her own hospital, other Danish and international hospitals.  
 Cobento Biotech was a global company from its initiation. In the business plan LB 
pointed out the potential customers world wide using intrinsic factors for B12 deficiency 
treatment and their current customers are all large multinationals. Moreover, parts of their 
current staff are international and their network contacts are mainly found in the international 
community of biotech and medical researchers in the US, UK and in Germany. 
 
Relations to the University. According LB, the university has not actively supported nor 
hindered the establishment of Cobento Biotech. However, the company is currently located at 
the Aarhus university science park close to the university campus. This park provides office 
space, administrative facilities to a relatively low rent for business start-ups affiliated with the 
university, and has been an important incubator of several biotech companies in Denmark 
(Norus, 2002). The company experienced few problems with the transfer of ownership rights. 
When considering the start-up of the firm, the founders filed a note to the University late 
December 1999 just before the University changed their regulations for ownership of 
knowledge. The procedure was to notice the university, stating that their invention and 
thereby giving the founders the total ownership. According to LB the new regime means that 
the university will put their hand on the invention and inventions may be lost due to lack of 
motivation and funding capital. LB finds it nevertheless important to keep a close relation to 
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the University to maintain access to of technical equipment and knowledge. For instance, 
LB’s former boss, who is also in the company, keeps his tenure. Likewise EN stays in the 
hospital and EØJ still works at the plant laboratory. Cobento therefore still has 3 key persons, 
which give them access to a wide range of resources, including lab facilities, potential 
employees, etc. 
Access to venture capital. In terms of raising venture capital the market has become very 
tight. A few years ago, the biotech sector was regarded as highly attractive for venture 
capitalists and capital was well available. However, as many ventures have failed, it is much 
harder today to raise venture capital. In the beginning the founders financed the establishment 
of the company as an “ApS” (a limited company) themselves together with a seed capital 
investment from the Teknologisk Institut (DTI). The money from DTI was dedicated to cover 
the expenses with filing for the patent, lawyers and other people that helped in setting up the 
company. Again the network of Lars Berglund became useful since one of his previous 
colleagues worked at the DTI. 
Today Cobento has – based on their lobbying activities – reached an agreement with 4 
different Venture Capital companies that were found in a screening process of 8 – 10 potential 
partners. The founders will end up with half of the ownership and explicit restrictions 
concerning their future position within the company. 
 
Relations to regulatory bodies and public institutions. The experience of handling the 
administrative experience in Cobento and setting up accounting procedures etc has been 
strongly supported by the Aarhus science park, and accountants paid for by the seed capital 
issued by Dansk Teknologisk Institut. An important issue however, concerns gaining 
permission to grow transgenetic plants on free land. Here, Danish public authorities are fairly 
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strict, with respect to allowing genetically modified plants into the Danish biosphere. So far 
all experiments with transgenetic plants have been carried out in specifically sealed green 
houses. Again, an important source of routine-based knowledge has been provided by the 
contacts of EØJ who is been able to draw on his personal experiences and that of his networks 
in handling the Danish farming authorities. 
 
ThermoGen Inc. – Platform Technologies 
In 1988 David Demirjian fostered ThermoGen Inc. together with his former professor from 
the University of Chicago, Malcolm Casadaban. The firm is located in Chicago, Illinois and 
until 1998 it rented its facilities from the incubator in the Chicago Technology Park.  
The platform technology is to develop and utilize thermophilic organisms that are used 
as biocatalysts. The biocatalysts, which are specific types of enzymes, can be used in 
industrial processes, for example in the development of foodstuffs, chemical products and 
pharmaceutical products. In relation to traditional industrial enzymes, thermophilic enzymes 
are more stabile and can function in high temperatures. Hence fermentation processes can be 
carried through much faster than is the case with existing techniques. ThermoGen did not 
search for venture capital money to develop the firm. 
 
Market enactment. ThermoGen’s opinion in this regard was that the pharmaceutical industry 
is the most open-minded when it comes to new process technologies because if a 
pharmaceutical firm does not make use of the latest and most sophisticated technologies it 
will lose money on its products. This statement is in opposition to the experience of Kem-En-
Tec when it introduced its process technologies to the pharmaceutical firms. The different 
experiences can have to do with the technologies that the two firms have utilized. For 
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instance, ThermoGen has introduced a test kit-alike product that can find the most efficient 
biocatalysts from a large sample of thermophilic organisms. Such a system helps to optimize 
the existing ways of fermenting and makes it possible to have both a faster process and 
cleaner fermentation processes. This makes ThermoGen’s processes more applicable 
compared to a situation where large process plants have to be readjusted. In the agricultural 
sector and in the food industry the attitude towards new technologies is different. The 
technologies the food industries rely on are regarded as sufficient and reliable since they have 
proven successful over the years. These industries are willing to use alternative technologies 
if the food industries do not have to be active in the development of the technology. It has to 
be technologies that can replace the old technologies with a minimum of switching costs.  
 
Relations to university. The initial problem was that the University of Chicago had the 
ownership rights to the research that was carried out in the laboratories. The group therefore 
contacted the “University Commercialization Centre,” an institution financed by the State of 
Illinois. The aim of the centre is to support the transformation of research projects into 
entrepreneurial firms. The centre was at that time located in the University of Chicago 
Bookstore, coincidentally the very same building as the research department of the group. The 
present Vice president of ThermoGen, Ray Willis, was at the time the director of the 
University Commercialization Centre and would ultimately be an important resource person 
in the process of realizing the dream of turning the group’s basic into a growing firm. 
Willis has an almost endless personal network with businesses, research institutions 
and public institutions specializing in industrial and technological development. Moreover 
Willis had assisted other entrepreneurs in the set-up of biotechnology firms and firms into 
information technology firms. Willis created his network through his employment in public 
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institutions all of which supported the development and initiation of trade and industry. Over 
the years Willis had set his marks on the organization and the strategic development in the 
firm. When the researchers first contacted Willis he arranged a meeting with the ARCH 
Development Fund, which is the University of Chicago patent office. Based on an evaluation 
of the technology, ARCH found that there were similar technologies available and that it 
could not license the technology to an industrial partner. Therefore, the researchers got 
exclusive rights to commercialize the technology. Afterwards the group returned to Willis and 
the University Commercialization Centre. The Commercialization Center gave ThermoGen a 
USD 25,000 loan, which was sufficient to locate the company in the Chicago Technology 
Parks incubator and to buy some used laboratory equipment. The USD 25,000 loan stretched 
a long way since none of the involved researchers at that time earned any money from their 
engagement in ThermoGen. Moreover, this loan was the critical early seed money needed to 
get the firm started. After getting located, Demirjian again turned to Willis for assistance in 
making contacts to the industry. The pharmaceutical firms were positive about the prospects 
of the development of biocatalysts, especially from one of the major companies in the field. 
Gradually more and more firms contacted ThermoGen asking for information about the 
services that the company provided. Based on the positive feedback from potential customers, 
ThermoGen could begin to apply for grants from the SBIR-program to develop the 
technological platform of the firm. 
The interviewees judged the role of the incubator in Chicago Technology as not only 
economically crucial. The firm definitely would not have existed without the incubator. The 
access up-to-date laboratory facilities in the initial phase would not have been possible to 
acquire for the USD 25,000 loan that was the company’s seed money. Add to this the 
different types of consultancy services that the incubator offered or provided for the firm over 
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the years. Surprisingly, the access to these collaborative constellations in the incubator 
influenced the way in which ThermoGen structured and organized its activities. The firms 
inside the incubator for instance developed a flexible collaborative system, a sort of social 
security system that meant that the firms internally could hire and lend out human resources 
in periods with ups and downs. In that way a sort of internal fence against bad times was 
established, this made it possible to preserve jobs for the people that the companies had hired. 
At the same time this collaborative system meant that all the firms did not necessarily need to 
acquire all laboratory facilities. For ThermoGen the collaborative system meant that the firm 
could stay independent of external financial investment for a longer period of time. 
 
AndCare Inc. – Diagnostic Devices 
AndCare was established in 1993 as a merger between two small entrepreneurial firms, 
LeadCare Inc. and Enzyme Technology Research Group. Steven Wegner, a paediatrician by 
profession, started LeadCare whereas professor of chemistry Robert Henkens and his late 
wife Carolyn Henkens founded Enzyme Technology Research Group. The aim of the two 
companies was very different and so was their point of departure. Wegner’s primary interest 
was in the development of diagnostic devices that could measure the concentration of lead in 
children’s blood. The idea was that the device should be smaller than a paperback book, 
simple to operate and less expensive (20,000 USD) than the existing test methods. Further the 
device should display the result of the test immediately after the testing. The idea was that the 
blood lead test should supplement the existing devices that were the size of a copy machine 
and varied in price from 50,000-100,000 USD, took skilled personnel to operate and gave the 
test result after 2-3 days. The basic idea of Enzyme Technology Research Group was to 
develop into a research boutique that survived from selling projects and doing contract 
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research. AndCare deliberately avoided to attract venture capital firms to the company. The 
reason this was that both founders had experienced that venture capital firms took too much 
ownership, took too much control of the technology and where only interesting in creating 
quick exits. 
 
Market enactment. In the initial stage, the founders thought that the market for LeadCare® 
amounted to USD 100 million per year. This calculation was based on President Clinton’s 
declaration of war on blood lead-poisoning in 1993, a disease that threatened American 
children leading to birth defects and lower intelligence levels. At the outset this was an 
obvious entrepreneurial success that was given attention from powerful public institutions 
such as the Federal Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Federal Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA).  
The basic idea was that AndCare should concentrate on the development of a 
diagnostic device with very specific functional characteristics, and afterwards search for 
relevant strategic partners in the areas of production, sales and marketing. It turned out that 
AndCare, due to the cancellation of the strategic alliances, carried out all the processes by 
itself. The bottom line is that AndCare developed and had the LeadCare product approved in 
collaboration with public authorities such as the FDA and the CDC. However, activities such 
as production and marketing and distribution were outsourced in external networks to a 
Boston Based company called ESA. 
The routines for AndCare were to develop its projects to a certain stage where it was 
interesting to present the idea to a larger firm with the necessary resources to finish the 
product in terms of sales and marketing. The search for partnerships consisted of three steps 
according to Steven Wegner: The first step was to seek for areas where a match could be 
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found between the interests of a partner and the competencies of AndCare. This process was 
based on existing knowledge of the potential partners, and accessible information from 
industrial journals, databases and the Internet. Second, before approaching a potential 
strategic partner the next crucial step was to be aware of what it took for a small research 
based firm to enter into a strategic partnership with a large corporation. In AndCare’s 
experience, a small firm like AndCare had to be willing to make compromises with its own 
intentions to establish the partnerships instead of continuing to search for the perfect 
partnership. Going back to the concept of search and bounded rationality, this illustrates that 
firms satisfy instead of optimize in the rational sense when it comes to their strategic search 
processes. Third, the initial contacts had to be established with the right person at the right 
level of the organization: A person that can take the responsibility and catalyze the 
organizational decision making process. Initially the contacts are personal based and informal 
in character. In AndCare’s experience, the formalization of the partnership is a long-term 
process. Being an entrepreneur in the area of biotechnology means that to get access to 
present your ideas to the right decision makers in large organizations you have to tolerate 
many rejections, and you only can expect very few positive reactions 
There are two ways of analyzing how AndCare tried to create a market for 
LeadCare®. In the beginning the firm tried to establish its name by letting the researchers 
employed at AndCare participate in the scientific community. The researchers filled this role 
through conference participation and journal publication in acknowledged scientific journals. 
The prototype testing was done by the use of Steven Wegner’s network of pediatricians. 
AndCare got important information concerning the functional aspects of the prototype not 
only the local network in North Carolina, but also from Boston Children’s Hospital. To speed 
up the development process AndCare made an overlap between the network of professional 
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users (pediatricians) and the in-house researchers’ scientific networks. This was done by the 
development of a meeting place, a new network where the researchers and the medical 
doctors were in direct contact on how to modify the final product.  
 
Relations to university. Three critical incidents meant that AndCare had to reject the first 
detection system for LeadCare®. First, the detection system was unstable with high 
temperatures. Second, the system could not fit into the simple-to-use aim that was the initial 
idea. Third, the market for LeadCare was estimated to be at least USD 100 million per year. 
But as the problem of lead poisoning diminished, the market decreased to approximately USD 
10 million per year. These three incidents led to one of the strategic partners immediately 
cancelling the strategic alliance. This strategic alliance had been very favourable for AndCare 
because that particular partner covered all the development expenses in connection to the 
LeadCare product. Moreover, it had been the agreement that this company would pay for all 
the costs for having FDA product approval. This was a partnership agreement worth 
approximately USD 1.5 million. The second company also cancelled their partnership 
agreement when they had problems keeping track of the original ideas.  
Wegner thought that it was important to development a product despite the fact that 
the earnings from LeadCare® were low or even negative. First, AndCare rejected the first 
technological concept of the measurement system in order to preserve the functional aims of 
the LeadCare product. Second, AndCare intensified the development of existing projects. 
Thereby a search process for alternative ideas where AndCare could utilize the measurement 
system in such way that the development of a new system be used to diagnostic kit in other 
diseases or food poisoning was established. The measurement technique that was used was 
based on research done by a professor at State University of New York, Buffalo (SUNY, 
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Buffalo) that the research director had collaborated with while he was a visiting professor. 
This concept was applicable and thereafter a prototype was tested in Wegner’s network of 
pediatricians before the LeadCare product was submitted to the FDA for approval. The 
mobilization of these networks provided the firm with an extra strategic asset, when the 
original technological system could not be brought to function in a way that was in 
accordance the overall goal of the product. 
 
Relations to regulatory bodies and public institutions. AndCare’s structuring of partnerships 
with both private companies and public institutions assisted in the approval of the LeadCare® 
product by the FDA. First of all, the partnership agreements were formed so that the partner 
bears the cost of the product approval. Moreover, the partner takes care of the direct contact 
with the public authorities. However it turned out that AndCare was much more involved than 
expected. The reason for this was that LeadCare® had attracted great interest from the Federal 
Centres of Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta. CDC is responsible for preventing and 
controlling epidemic diseases throughout the US. CDC had some grants that the firm applied 
for in the development of LeadCare® and the interest of CDC in the LeadCare product helped 
to make the FDA aware of the product so that the product was approved for sale more rapidly. 
 
CASE ANALYSIS 
Based on our four case studies, we can address the issue of how and to what extent the firm 
creation task differ across institutional contexts and what role is played by the network 
embedded routines in channelling actors’ firm creation efforts. An overview of the four cases 
of firm creation and corresponding answers to the creation of legitimacy in relation to market 
enactment, university relations, public authorities and venture capitalists are shown in table 1. 
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********************************************************* 
Table 1 in here 
************************************************************ 
 In general, the process of evoking external routines in support of firm creation is apparent 
in all cases studied. Hence, we believe that the case studies lend support to our initial research 
question and warrant a further investigation of the institutional environment in shaping the 
entrepreneurs’ job. Rather than charting completely unfamiliar territory, the process of 
founding the company is strongly depending on access to network embedded routines within 
a particular institutional context. With regard to market enactment, rather than visualizing 
market potentials based on specific visionary capabilities, biotech entrepreneurs in our cases 
heavily draw on network-embedded routines for establishing market legitimacy. Perhaps this 
idea is best illustrated in the AndCare case, where the entrepreneurial idea is to create viable 
biotech business platforms for other and more resourceful companies to exploit. Moreover, 
the procedures upon which they draw are not created specifically for the purpose of 
establishing this particular firm, but are pre-existing routines, available in the institutional 
context of the entrepreneur. Hence, existing customers, colleagues and links to federal 
institutions all provide “ready-made” procedures that the biotech entrepreneur can assemble 
and use for market enactment. Similarly, with respect to contacts to public authorities, the 
experience from colleagues in similar positions provided a setting of routines available to the 
entrepreneur in handling legitimacy processes. One issue where routines seemingly fall short 
in the biotech sector however, concerns access to venture capitalists. It is a consistent 
impression from our case studies, that there are few if any external routines to draw upon 
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when it comes to creating legitimacy towards venture capitalists. Although biotech 
entrepreneurs can draw upon specialized and available resources for preparing business plans, 
it is the cumbersome task of the biotech entrepreneur to initiate and develop contacts with 
holders of venture capital. 
 Our second issue concerns the variety of the institutional context and how it affects the 
network embedded routines available to the entrepreneur. Our expectations were that diversity 
in institutional contexts would lead to difference either in the constitution of routines and/or in 
the type of actors holding them. However, the cross-case comparison leaves the strong 
impression that similarities rather than differences in network embedded routines prevail. The 
use of personal contacts in the scientific communities for market enactment purposes and the 
supportive role of host universities seem to be a general characteristic. Moreover, contrary to 
our expectations there is little difference in the firm creation procedures when comparing the 
US and Denmark. Seen from an institutional point of view we find this to be a rather 
interesting observation, since literature on economic sociology notably that dealing with 
institutional governance suggest otherwise. For instance, Whitley (1992) talks against 
universalistic organisational models and in favour of the nation state as a strongly influencing 
force in the structuring of economic life. However, for several reasons the science-based 
entrepreneurs in the biotech sector may well be an exception to this principle. First, all of the 
cases studied here involve entrepreneurs with a scientific background, which more or less all 
belong to the international scientific community. Within this community there may well be 
established “industry recipes” concerning how a biotech company should be managed and 
formed, influencing the norms governing biotech entrepreneurs (Spender, 1989). Secondly, 
since most if not all potential customers are multinational players, at least on important part of 
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the institutional environment of these companies is fairly consistent with regard to legitimacy 
claims.  
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The aim of our paper has been to initiate a discussion on the role of the biotech entrepreneur 
versus the institutional context in firm creation processes. So far few efforts have been done 
in linking the literature on institutional organisation theory with that of firm creation and 
entrepreneurship. From an institutional point of view, the process of creating legitimacy from 
external surroundings becomes a key issue in firm creation processes. Our basic idea is that in 
strongly institutionalized environments such as the biotech sector, external routines 
supporting entrepreneurs in their firm creation activities prevails and that the role of these 
routines in forming the entrepreneurial task calls for closer scrutiny. Moreover, we suggested 
that the character and availability of such routines is dependent on the institutional 
environment of the organisation. In order to support our claims further, we have conducted an 
explorative case study, involving four cases from the biotech sector. Although the explorative 
case study partly supports our initial notion that the definition of the entrepreneurial task 
largely draws upon the external environment, a more through and systematic study of firm 
creation processes in different institutional contexts is called for.  
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 FIGURE 1: Firm creation and network embedded routines in an institutional context 
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FIGURE 2: Regulatory domains in pharmaceutical biotechnology 
 
 
 
 
Therapeutics 
(Cobento) 
Medical devices 
(Kem-En-Tec) 
 
Diagnostics 
(AndCare) 
 
Platform technologies 
(ThermoGen) 
 Human testing    
Weaker regulation                                        Stronger regulation  
Non-human testing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 40
TABLE 1: A cross-case comparison of legitimacy creation-processes in firm creation 
 Kem-En-Tec Cobento ThermoGen AndCare 
Institutional 
environment 
Medical devices Therapeutics Platform Technologies Diagnostics 
 
 
 
Market 
enactment 
Created legitimacy 
through mediating 
activities such as  
research publishing,  
development of a 
consultancy service 
oriented towards the 
major process 
industries and 
pharmaceutical firms. 
 
Merging two firms 
from two research 
institutions to 
approach a similar 
market 
Legitimacy created by 
using key actor in 
hospital sector as 
bridgehead to other 
contacts in the 
international research 
community 
Legitimacy created by 
developing profession-
nal user groups toget-
her and formed test 
groups with future 
customers.  
 
Developed market 
through long-term 
relationships with 
business partners. 
 
Extensive use of 
resource persons 
network  
Used access to Federal 
Agencies to legitimise 
product orientation and 
to search for strategic 
partners with large 
pharmaceutical firms.  
 
Used one of the 
founders relations in 
among local 
paediatricians area to 
test and legitimise 
their product to 
potential 
customers/users 
 
 
 
 
Relations to 
university 
Routinized scientific 
values in the research 
labs to stay creative  
 
Used university labs in 
the initial stage before 
moving to incubator 
Including key 
university actors in  
Company board in 
order to continue 
relations with 
university and 
maintain access to 
facilities. 
Preserved co-scientific 
founder active in the 
board where he served 
as scientific advisor.  
 
Crucial role of 
incubator also as 
knowledge provider 
 
Used university labs in 
initial stages.  
Extensive use of 
research director’s 
former research 
institution, especially 
in technological 
problem solving. 
Relations to 
regulatory 
bodies and 
public 
institutions 
Did not engage with 
public programmes 
and sold projects to 
industrial partners 
before engaging with 
regulatory aspects. 
Drawing on contacts to 
and experience from 
colleagues at 
university 
Drawing from contacts 
within the Science 
parks  
Good contacts to 
regulatory agencies 
due the interest in the 
product from several 
Federal institutions. 
Access to 
Venture 
capital 
Two Venture capital 
firms was attracted to 
the firm and some of 
the original founders 
was bought out. VC 
forced the company to 
routinize a distinct 
business model for 
each of  their research 
projects. 
No external routines 
evoked 
No venture capital 
money. The firm 
solely relied on public 
funding from Federal 
Business Development 
Programme. No 
external routines 
evoked 
All Venture Capital 
was deliberately 
abandoned. No 
external routines 
evoked 
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